Gordon Goines v. Valley Community Services Board

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1589

GORDON GOINES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

VALLEY COMMUNITY SERVICES BOARD; DAVID SHAW; ROBERT DEAN; D. L. WILLIAMS; JENNA RHODES; JOHN DOES 1-10,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Elizabeth Kay Dillon, District Judge. (5:14-cv-00065-EKD-JCH)

Argued: January 26, 2016 Decided: May 9, 2016

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the opinion in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Niemeyer joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a separate concurring opinion.

Timothy Lawrence Coffield, COFFIELD PLLC, Keswick, Virginia; Jesse Howard Baker, LAW OFFICE OF JESSE BAKER IV, Gainesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Hustis Milnor, ZUNKA MILNOR & CARTER, LTD, Charlottesville, Virginia; James Morton Bowling, ST. JOHN, BOWLING, LAWRENCE & QUAGLIANA, LLP, Charlottesville, Virginia; Rosalie Fessier, TIMBERLAKE, SMITH, THOMAS & MOSES, PC, Staunton, Virginia, for Appellees. TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

Gordon Goines went to the police station to report the

theft of his cable services and ended up involuntarily detained

for six days for a mental-health evaluation. Goines thereafter

brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was

unlawfully seized without probable cause in violation of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Goines named as defendants

the police officers who initially detained him, as well as the

mental-health worker who evaluated him, and the mental-health

worker’s employer. The district court granted the defendants’

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6), and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. We

conclude that the claims against the mental-health evaluator and

her employer were properly dismissed. As to the two officers

who initially took Goines into custody, however, we find the

allegations of Goines’ complaint sufficient to survive the

motion to dismiss. We therefore affirm the district court’s

order in part, vacate in part, and remand for further

proceedings.

I.

In § 1983 actions, government officials are entitled to

qualified immunity so long as they have not violated “clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

2 reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The contours of the law relevant to

this case are easily stated. “[T]he general right to be free

from seizure unless probable cause exists is clearly established

in the mental health seizure context. . . . [A]n officer must

have probable cause to believe that the individual posed a

danger to himself or others before involuntarily detaining the

individual.” Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 741 (4th Cir.

2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). We

will consider the sufficiency of Goines’ complaint in light of

this standard.

II.

According to the allegations of the complaint, Goines

suffers from cerebellar ataxia, a neurological condition that

causes him difficulties with his speech, balance, and certain

fine motor functions. The disorder does not affect Goines’

cognitive functioning, and he has no mental health issues.

In May 2014, Goines began experiencing problems with his

cable television service -- the service would intermittently

disconnect and the television would freeze and produce loud line

noises while it was turned on. A technician with the cable

provider visited Goines on May 15 and determined that an unknown

neighbor had spliced into Goines’ cable, causing the

disconnections and line noises. The technician advised Goines

3 to report the theft to the police. Goines thereafter walked

across the street to the police station and reported the cable

theft, telling the police that he did not want to confront the

neighbor because he did not know how the neighbor would react

and he did not want to get into a fight.

The officer to whom Goines first spoke turned him over to

defendant officers David Shaw and Robert Dean (together, the

“Officers”). Goines agreed to take the Officers back to his

apartment so he could demonstrate the problem. Because the

Officers did not turn on the television, however, they did not

hear the noises. The Officers asked Goines if he had any mental

health issues, which Goines denied, and asked whether “he

‘wanted to talk to someone.’” J.A 12. Believing that he would

be speaking to someone about the cable theft, Goines answered in

the affirmative. The Officers then handcuffed Goines, walked

him back to the police station, and placed him in the back of a

patrol car. Goines told the Officers he wanted to go home and

asked to be let out of the car, but Officer Dean told Goines

“‘that wasn’t an option.’” J.A. 12. The Officers transported

Goines, involuntarily, to the Augusta County Medical Center,

where he was strip-searched and handcuffed to a table. While at

the Medical Center, the Officers learned that Goines owned a

registered handgun. Goines volunteered to give the gun to the

4 Officers if “‘there was a problem,’” J.A. 13, and Goines

reiterated his desire to go home.

Goines was evaluated at the Medical Center by defendant

Jenna Rhodes, an emergency services and intake clinician

employed by defendant Valley Community Services Board. Goines

attached as an exhibit to his complaint the “Preadmission

Screening Report” completed by Rhodes. J.A. 22. In the

Screening Report, Rhodes described her personal observations of

Goines as well as information about Goines’ statements and

behavior that the Officers had provided her. Based on her

observations and the Officers’ information, Rhodes concluded

that Goines suffered from a mental illness and that he posed a

threat to the safety of his neighbors, and Rhodes filed a

petition seeking to have Goines involuntarily detained. The

magistrate judge granted the petition at 8:41 p.m. on May 15,

2014, and issued a temporary detention order. Goines thereafter

was transported to Crossroads Mental Health Center, where he

remained until he was released on May 20, 2014.

The facts set out above form the core of Goines’

constitutional claims that the defendants violated the Fourth

Amendment because they lacked probable cause to believe Goines

had a mental illness and was a threat to himself or others. In

addition to these facts, however, Goines’ complaint contains

several references to a report (the “Incident Report”) that

5 Officer Shaw prepared sometime after the interaction with

Goines.

Quoting from the Incident Report, the complaint states that

the first police officer to whom Goines spoke told Officers Shaw

and Dean that Goines “‘seemed to have some mental health issues

going on over an issue with a television.’” J.A. 11. The

complaint also alleges that the Officers “ignored or did not

take the time to understand” the nature of Goines’ problem --

that someone had spliced into his cable, which was causing line

noises and other issues when the television was turned on. As

an apparent indication of the Officers’ failure to understand,

the complaint then quotes Shaw’s statement in the Incident

Report that Goines told the Officers that “‘there was a clicking

noise in the wall because someone outside was controlling his

T.V.’” J.A. 11. The complaint, again quoting from the Incident

Report, states that even though Goines denied having any mental

health issues, the Officers “[n]evertheless . . . concluded that

Goines was ‘having irrational issues and hearing things.’” J.A.

12.

Although Goines quoted the Incident Report in his

complaint, he did not attach it as an exhibit or explicitly

incorporate the entire report by reference. The defendants,

however, attached a copy of the Incident Report to their motion

to dismiss and referred to other parts of the Incident Report --

6 i.e., parts not quoted by Goines -- when arguing that Goines

failed to state a claim.

While a 12(b)(6) motion focuses on the allegations of the

complaint, it is well established that a document attached to a

motion to dismiss may be considered when evaluating a motion to

dismiss if the document was “integral to the complaint and

authentic.” Sec’y of State For Defence v. Trimble Nav. Ltd.,

484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). The district court therefore

treated the Incident Report as if it had been attached to the

complaint and considered the contents of the Incident Report.

Recognizing the general rule that the exhibit prevails in the

event of a conflict between an attached exhibit and the

allegations of a complaint, see S. Walk at Broadlands

Homeowner’s Ass’n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175,

182 (4th Cir. 2013), the district court believed that because

the Incident Report was prepared by the Officers and reflected

their version of the relevant events, an exception to the

exhibit-prevails rule was required. Accordingly, when

considering the sufficiency of Goines’ complaint, the district

court treated the contents of the Incident Report as true,

except where “the complaint expressly conflicts with, or

contradicts any factual allegations in the . . . Incident

Report.” J.A. 187-88 (emphasis added).

7  As to the constitutional claims against the Officers, the

district court determined that the facts reflected in the

complaint and Incident Report established that the Officers were

entitled to qualified immunity. In the district court’s view,

“it was objectively reasonable for the officers to conclude that

there was probable cause to believe Goines was suffering from a

mental illness,” and it was likewise objectively reasonable to

believe “that there was probable cause to believe Goines posed a

threat to others.” J.A. 200. Central to the court’s analysis

were certain “facts” appearing in the Incident Report but not in

the Complaint: (1) that Goines told the Officers while they were

in his apartment that he was then hearing noises that the

Officers could not hear and repeatedly said that “someone

outside [was] controlling” his television, J.A. 39, which made

it objectively reasonable for the Officers to conclude that

Goines had a mental illness; and (2) that Goines, in response to

a series of questions from the Officers, stated that he would

“hurt” his neighbors “by punching them,” J.A. 39, which made it

objectively reasonable for the Officers to conclude that Goines

was a threat to others. The court therefore dismissed the

claims against the Officers.

The court likewise dismissed the constitutional claims

against Rhodes and her employer. As previously noted, Goines

attached the Screening Report prepared by Rhodes to his

8 complaint. The district court took the same approach with the

Screening Report as it did with the Incident Report -- unless

the complaint explicitly contradicted the Screening Report, the

court accepted the contents of the Screening Report as true.

The district court concluded that, in light of the information

set out in the Screening Report, Rhodes had probable cause to

believe that Goines had a mental illness and was a danger to

others. Accordingly, the court dismissed the claims against

Rhodes and her employer.

This appeal followed.

III.

We begin with Goines’ claims against the Officers. Goines

argues that the district court erred in treating the allegations

of the Incident Report as true and that the allegations in his

complaint establish that the Officers lacked probable cause to

believe that he was mentally ill or that he posed a danger to

himself or others. As noted above, the district court relied on

the Incident Report to dismiss the claim against the Officers.

The question, then, is whether the court’s reliance on that

document was proper.

A.

“A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint,”

Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 2013),

and our evaluation is thus generally limited to a review of the

9 allegations of the complaint itself. However, we also consider

documents that are explicitly incorporated into the complaint by

reference, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551

U.S. 308, 322 (2007), and those attached to the complaint as

exhibits, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). And, as mentioned above,

we may consider a document submitted by the movant that was not

attached to or expressly incorporated in a complaint, so long as

the document was integral to the complaint and there is no

dispute about the document’s authenticity. See Trimble, 484

F.3d at 705; Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc.,

367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004); Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc.,

190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999).

Whether the court properly considered the Incident Report,

which was quoted in but not attached to the complaint, is not

entirely clear. Although the complaint included a few quotes

from and references to the Incident Report, Goines’ claims do

not turn on, nor are they otherwise based on, statements

contained in the Incident Report. See Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d

57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Limited quotation from or reference to

documents that may constitute relevant evidence in a case is not

enough to incorporate those documents, wholesale, into the

complaint.”). Under these circumstances, the Incident Report

arguably is not integral to the complaint and therefore should

not have been considered by the district court. See Chambers v.

10 Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining

that a document is “integral to the complaint” “where the

complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 249, 255 (2d

Cir. 2015) (document with “no independent legal significance to

[plaintiff’s] claim” was not integral to complaint).

Nonetheless, because Goines does not argue otherwise, we

will assume without deciding that the Incident Report was

integral to the complaint. And because there is no question

about the authenticity of the Incident Report, we will therefore

assume that the district court properly treated the Incident

Report as if it had been attached to the complaint. The more

difficult question is whether the district court properly

treated the factual contents of the Incident Report as true.

As previously noted, the district court’s approach to this

question began with its recognition of the exhibit-prevails

rule, which provides that “in the event of conflict between the

bare allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached . . .

, the exhibit prevails.” Fayetteville Inv’rs v. Commercial

Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991)); accord S.

Walk, 713 F.3d at 182. Under the rule, if a plaintiff “attaches

documents and relies upon the documents to form the basis for a

claim or part of a claim, dismissal is appropriate if the

document negates the claim.” Thompson v. Illinois Dep’t of

11 Prof’l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, if a breach-of-contract plaintiff alleges a failure

to perform an act required by the contract, the contract’s

description of the defendant’s duties will prevail over the

plaintiff’s contrary characterization. See E. Shore Markets,

Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 181 (4th Cir.

2000) (district court properly dismissed breach-of-lease claim

where terms of attached lease established that landlord had the

contractual right to take action challenged by the plaintiff);

cf. S. Walk, 713 F.3d at 182 (looking to terms of attached

contract to conclude that plaintiff seeking to invalidate

portions of the contract lacked standing). Similarly, if a

securities-fraud plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s

prospectus failed to disclose a material risk, the claim will be

dismissed if the prospectus shows the disclosure was in fact

made. See Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharm. Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 625

(4th Cir. 2008) (where securities-fraud complaint quoted from

investment analysts’ reports to support claim that defendant

intentionally misled the public, district court properly

reviewed reports in their entirety when dismissing the

complaint).

Animating the exhibit-prevails rule is the presumption that

the plaintiff, by basing his claim on the attached document, has

adopted as true the contents of that document. Plaintiffs

12 attach exhibits to their complaints for all sorts of reasons,

however, see EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d

773, 778 (7th Cir. 2007), and it is not always appropriate to

conclude that the plaintiff has adopted the contents of an

attached document, see N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City

of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that

“Rule 10(c) does not require a plaintiff to adopt every word

within the exhibits as true for purposes of pleading simply

because the documents were attached to the complaint to support

an alleged fact”). Indeed, if attached documents were always

treated as if their contents were adopted by the plaintiff, a

libel plaintiff would plead himself out of court simply by

attaching the libelous writing to his complaint. See Gant v.

Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A]

libel plaintiff may attach the writing alleged in the complaint

to be libelous without risk that the court will deem true all

libels in it.”). Accordingly, before treating the contents of

an attached or incorporated document as true, the district court

should consider the nature of the document and why the plaintiff

attached it. Cf. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor, 163 F.3d at 455 (before

treating contents of attached document as true, courts should

“consider why a plaintiff attached the document[], who authored

the document[], and the reliability of the document[]”).

13  When the plaintiff attaches or incorporates a document upon

which his claim is based, or when the complaint otherwise shows

that the plaintiff has adopted the contents of the document,

crediting the document over conflicting allegations in the

complaint is proper. See, e.g., Am. Chiropractic, 367 F.3d at

233-35 (dismissing civil RICO claim despite complaint’s

allegation of justifiable reliance where terms of document upon

which claim was based established that any reliance would not

have been justified). But in cases where the plaintiff attaches

or incorporates a document for purposes other than the

truthfulness of the document, it is inappropriate to treat the

contents of that document as true. For example, if a prisoner

attaches an unfavorable decision from a prison tribunal to show

that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, he does not

thereby adopt the factual findings of that unfavorable decision.

See Carroll v. Yates, 362 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 2004)

(rejecting as “fantastic” the argument that “all facts contained

in any attachments to a complaint are automatically deemed facts

alleged as part of the complaint” (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted)). Similarly, if a plaintiff attaches or

references a report prepared by a third-party to show how he

learned of certain facts alleged in his complaint, he does not

automatically adopt all of the factual conclusions contained in

the report. See Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d

14 1119, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Banneker referred to some of the

report’s recitations to show how it learned some facts in the

complaint, but it did not purport to and was not required to

adopt the factual contents of the report wholesale.”).

The purpose for which the document is offered is

particularly important where the document is one prepared by or

for the defendant. Such unilateral documents may reflect the

defendant’s version of contested events or contain self-serving,

exculpatory statements that are unlikely to have been adopted by

the plaintiff. Treating the contents of such a document as true

simply because it was attached to or relied upon in the

complaint, even though the plaintiff relied on it for purposes

other than truthfulness, would be “contrary to the concept of

notice pleading” and “would enable parties to hide behind

untested, self-serving assertions.” N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor, 163

F.3d at 456.

B.

In this case, we think it clear that Goines did not adopt

the Incident Report as true simply by relying on the Report for

some of the facts alleged in his complaint. As previously

noted, Goines does not base his claims on the Incident Report --

that is, no portion of any of his claims is dependent upon the

truth of any statements contained in the Incident Report.

Instead, Goines’ complaint tells the story of police who assumed

15 from Goines’ physical difficulties that he was mentally ill and

never actually listened to what Goines was telling them, and

Goines referred to portions of the Incident Report to support

that theory of the case. Thus, Goines alleged that he is not

mentally ill, but then quoted from the Incident Report that the

first police officer to whom Goines spoke told the Officers that

Goines “‘seemed to have some mental health issues.’” J.A. 11.

Goines alleged that the line noises and other problems with his

television service occurred when the television was turned on

and that the Officers did not hear the line noises because they

never turned on the television. See Complaint, J.A. 10-12, ¶¶

18-19, 27. Goines juxtaposed these clear allegations against

the statement in the Incident Report that Goines told the

Officers that “‘there was a clicking noise in the wall because

someone outside was controlling his T.V.,’” J.A. 11, which

Goines contended showed that the Officers “ignored or did not

take the time to understand Goines’ complaint,” id. Likewise,

Goines alleged that he told the Officers that he did not have

any “mental health issues,” but that the Officers

“[n]evertheless” determined that Goines was “‘having irrational

issues and hearing things.’” J.A. 12. Thus, when the complaint

is read in the light most favorable to Goines and in light of

his theory of the case, it is apparent that Goines’ purpose in

quoting from the Incident Report was not to assert the

16 truthfulness of the statements contained in the Report, but

instead to illustrate the mistakes he believed were made by the

Officers.

Because Goines did not rely on the Incident Report for its

truthfulness, the district court erred by treating as true the

factual statements contained in the Incident Report. The

district court instead should have treated the Report as what it

was -- a document prepared by Officer Shaw representing the

Officers’ view of events, not a document representing the true

facts. See Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 561 (6th

Cir. 2008) (in case where plaintiff attached to his complaint

transcripts of investigatory interviews with defendant police

officers, declining to “assume everything the officers said in

those interviews is true”). The court likewise should have

treated Goines’ allegations regarding the Incident Report as

what they were -- allegations that the Officers made the quoted

statements, not allegations that the statements themselves were

true. See id. (“[W]e treat the exhibit as an allegation that

the officers made the statements in the transcript and we treat

that allegation as true. . . . We do not accept as true,

however, that [the officers’ statements are] accurate or

true.”); N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor, 163 F.3d at 455 (“The letters

that [the plaintiff] attached to its complaint demonstrate that

[the defendant] stated it adopted the policy for safety reasons

17 during a public meeting that had been publicized and during

which individuals opposed to the policy had the opportunity to

voice their concerns. [Attaching the letters to the complaint]

does not, however, establish the truth of these unilateral

statements.” (emphasis added)).

C.

When the statements in the Incident Report are treated not

as true, but as assertions made by the Officers, we have little

difficulty in concluding that Goines’ claims against the

Officers should not have been dismissed.

To withstand a motion to dismiss, a § 1983 plaintiff must

allege facts that, “if true, show a violation of clearly

established constitutional rights.” Cloaninger ex rel. Estate

of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 331 (4th Cir. 2009).

“[T]he general right to be free from seizure unless probable

cause exists is clearly established in the mental health seizure

context.” Bailey, 349 F.3d at 741 (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted). “[P]robable cause to seize a person for a

psychological evaluation [exists] when the facts and

circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had

reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a

prudent man to believe that the person poses a danger to himself

or others.” Cloaninger, 555 F.3d at 334 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

18  Goines alleged that he has no mental illness, and the facts

he described in the complaint -– noises in the television line

and signal disruption caused by a neighbor splicing into Goines’

cable line and a desire not to fight with the thieving neighbor

-- provided no basis for the Officers to have reasonably

concluded otherwise. While the Incident Report indicates that

Goines told the Officers that he was hearing noises in the

apartment that they could not hear, that assertion cannot be

treated as true, and there are no facts alleged in the complaint

that would permit the inference that Goines heard noises in the

apartment. Indeed, given Goines’ allegations that the noise

occurred when the television was turned on and that the officers

never turned on the television, the only permissible inference

that can be drawn from the complaint is that Goines did not hear

noises because the television was never turned on. See, e.g.,

United States ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance

Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that when

reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “we construe facts in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draw all

reasonable inferences in his favor” (citation, alteration, and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

The facts as alleged in the complaint likewise provided no

reasonable basis for the Officers to have concluded that Goines

was a danger to himself or others. Goines alleged that he went

19 to the police “because he did not know how the neighbor would

react” to a confrontation with Goines and “he did not want to

‘get in a fight’ with the neighbor,” J.A. 11, and that he never

made “any threat to do harm to any person or to himself,” J.A.

12. These allegations are contradicted by assertions contained

in the Incident Report, but, again, those assertions cannot be

treated as true. By quoting from and referring to the Incident

Report, Goines effectively alleged that the Officers viewed the

facts differently, but he did not adopt the Officers’ version of

the facts as his own. Goines’ preemptive acknowledgement of the

defense may be unusual as a matter of pleading style, but it

does not make Goines’ allegations of the relevant facts

implausible or otherwise support a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in

the face of disputed facts. See Gale v. Hyde Park Bank, 384

F.3d 451, 452 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he plaintiff may tell the

court what his adversary has said without throwing in the

towel.”).

Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, Goines,

though having speech and other physical difficulties, exhibited

no signs of mental illness and made no threats to harm himself

or others, but instead sought the help of the police to avoid a

confrontation and potential fight with a neighbor who had

spliced into Goines’ cable line. Under these facts, the

Officers lacked probable cause for an emergency mental-health

20 detention, and Goines’ complaint therefore alleges a

constitutional violation. See Bailey, 349 F.3d at 739 (“If

probable cause was lacking, then [the plaintiff] has

successfully asserted the violation of a constitutional right --

specifically his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable

seizure . . . .”).

And again accepting Goines’ allegations as true, the

constitutional violation alleged is one for which the Officers

would not be entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified

immunity shields government officials from civil liability

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir.

2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The relevant,

dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); see Smith v. Reddy,

101 F.3d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1996) (“If the right was not clearly

established at the relevant time or if a reasonable officer

might not have known his or her conduct violated that right, the

officer is entitled to immunity.”).

Probable cause, of course, is a “fluid concept that cannot

be reduced to a neat set of legal rules,” Bailey, 349 F.3d at

21 739 (internal quotation marks omitted), and our cases applying

the concept in the mental-health context are perhaps not easily

reduced to bright-line rules. Nonetheless, the facts as alleged

by Goines -- the involuntary detention of a man with physical

disabilities who exhibited no signs of mental illness and made

no threats of harm -- are sufficiently beyond the realm of

probable cause that no reasonable police officer would find them

adequate. See id. at 740 (“The law does not permit random or

baseless detention of citizens for psychological evaluations.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because Goines’ complaint plausibly alleges facts that no

reasonable officer would have found sufficient to justify an

emergency mental-health detention, the complaint states a

constitutional violation by the Officers for which they would

not be entitled to qualified immunity.

The whole area of civil commitment involves a number of

difficult judgment calls, especially for officers with little or

no training in mental health issues. Under the facts as

alleged, however, the officers failed to make sufficient

inquiry. As noted, this was not a matter of a third-party

complaint. Goines himself had reported to the stationhouse

seeking police assistance. The officers, however, simply

assumed a threat without exploring whether the situation

reflected some misunderstanding, a bizarre but non-dangerous

22 incident, or something more problematic. Further inquiry is

useful in the sorts of situations where officers are not

presented with emergency circumstances or a “substantial

likelihood” of harmful behavior. Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-808. We

therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of the claims

against the Officers and remand for further proceedings on those

claims. 1 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

(2007) (“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is

improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

IV.

We turn now to Goines’ claims against Jenna Rhodes, the

mental-health evaluator, and her employer, Valley Community

Services Board.

Goines’ claims against these defendants, as we understand

them, proceed on a very different path from his claims against

the Officers. As we explained in the previous section, because

1 In addition to Officers Shaw and Dean, Goines named Officer D.L. Williams as a defendant. Although the district court dismissed the claims against Williams, Goines does not challenge that dismissal on appeal. Goines has thus abandoned his claims against Williams, and we therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of those claims. See, e.g., Suarez– Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 248–49 (4th Cir. 2013) (issues not raised in the argument section of the opening brief are abandoned).

23 Goines’ claims against the Officers were not based on the

Incident Report and Goines did not otherwise adopt it, we did

not treat the contents of the Incident Report as true when

evaluating the claims against the Officers. The claims against

Rhodes and her employer, however, are based on the Screening

Report. That is, Goines does not contend that the Officers did

not provide the information set out in the Screening Report or

that Rhodes otherwise fabricated the information in the Report.

Instead, Goines contends that the information in the Screening

Report is not sufficient to provide probable cause for a mental-

health detention. See Complaint, J.A. 16 (“Based on the

observations of Goines as set forth in the Preadmission

Screening Report, Defendant Rhodes lacked probable cause . . .

.”); Brief of Appellant at 38 (“No objectively reasonable

evaluator would have concluded, based on the information

available to Rhodes, that Goines had a mental illness.”); Brief

of Appellant at 43 (“No objectively reasonable evaluator would

have concluded, based on the information available to Rhodes,

that Goines, as a result of mental illness, posed an imminent

threat to others.”). Goines has thus accepted the contents of

the Screening Report and based his claims on the assumed truth

of the Screening Report. Under these circumstances, then, it is

proper for us to likewise assume the truth of the Screening

Report when considering whether Goines has stated a claim

24 against Rhodes and her employer. See Am. Chiropractic, 367 F.3d

at 233-35 (dismissing civil RICO claim by looking to terms of

document upon which claim was based); E. Shore Markets, 213 F.3d

at 181 (looking to terms of attached lease when dismissing

breach-of-lease complaint).

Accordingly, the question on appeal is whether the

information contained in the Screening Report is sufficient to

provide probable cause for an emergency mental-health detention.

We believe it is. 2

The Screening Report contains Rhodes’ personal observations

of Goines and notes that Goines’ eyes were darting around as if

he were responding to visual hallucinations; that Goines was

2 Relying on Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1991), the district court rested its probable-cause analysis in part on the court’s view that the magistrate’s issuance of the temporary detention order created a rebuttable presumption of probable cause. In Torchinsky, a false-arrest case, we used rebuttable-presumption language when considering the effect of the issuance of an arrest warrant based on judicial findings of probable cause on the arresting officer’s claim of qualified immunity. See id. at 261 (“[T]he decision of a detached district judge that Siwinski satisfied the more stringent probable cause standard is plainly relevant to a showing that he met the lower standard of objective reasonableness required for qualified immunity.”). The presumption in Torchinsky thus was not a presumption that probable cause existed, but a presumption of the reasonableness of the officer’s reliance on the arrest warrant. See id. at 262 (“The presumption of reasonableness attached to obtaining a warrant can be rebutted where a reasonably well-trained officer . . . would have known that his application failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).

25 perseverating on a neighbor “controlling” his television; that

Goines displayed inappropriate affect (including laughing at

inappropriate times) and delayed response; and that Goines was

disoriented as to time, believing it to be March 2012 rather

than May 2014. The Screening Report also contains information

given to Rhodes by the Officers, including the Officers’ reports

that Goines heard clicking noises in his apartment that they did

not hear and that Goines first threatened to assault his

neighbors “with [his] hands” and then later threatened to take

care of the problem himself “with his Smith & Wesson firearm.”

J.A. 23. According to the Screening Report, Goines repeated his

threat to Rhodes, telling her that if released, “he [would]

return home and assault his neighbors ‘because [he was] just

tired of it.’” 3 J.A. 23.

As we have explained, “probable cause to seize a person for

a psychological evaluation [exists] when the facts and

circumstances within [the defendant’s] knowledge and of which

[the defendant] had reasonably trustworthy information were

3 Goines alleged in his complaint that he never threatened to harm anyone, an allegation we treated as true as to his claims against the Officers. As we have explained, however, Goines has accepted the truth of the Screening Report for purposes of his claims against Rhodes and her employer, such that the Screening Report controls over the contrary allegation in his complaint. See, e.g., S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 2013)

26 sufficient to warrant a prudent man to believe that the person

poses a danger to himself or others.” Cloaninger, 555 F.3d at

334 (internal quotation marks omitted). In our view, the

information set out in the Screening Report satisfies this

standard. 4 Rhodes observed Goines behaving as if he were

responding to visual hallucinations, and she had “reasonably

trustworthy information” from the Officers that Goines was

suffering from auditory hallucinations as well. Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). In Rhodes’ presence, Goines

threatened to attack his neighbors when released, and Rhodes was

informed by the Officers that Goines had earlier made similar

threats. In our view, these facts are “sufficient to warrant a

prudent man to believe the person poses a danger to himself or

others,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), thus

establishing probable cause for the emergency mental-health

detention. 5

4 Goines told Rhodes that he was “born with a ‘shrunken cerebellum,’” J.A. 23, and gave her the name of his primary care physician, and he seems to suggest that Rhodes’ failure to confer with Goines’ physician somehow negates probable cause. We disagree. Cf. Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Although an officer may not disregard readily available exculpatory evidence of which he is aware, the failure to pursue a potentially exculpatory lead is not sufficient to negate probable cause.”).

5 In his brief, Goines makes much of the fact that Rhodes included a diagnosis of “Psychotic Disorder NOS [not otherwise specified]” in the Screening Report. J.A. 27. Goines (Continued) 27  As explained above, Goines has accepted the information set

out in the Screening Report for purposes of his claim against

Rhodes. And because that information established probable

contends that Rhodes, who is not a psychiatrist or psychologist, lacks the qualifications necessary to make such a diagnosis, and he argues that Rhodes misled the magistrate about her qualifications by including the diagnosis in the Screening Report relied upon by the magistrate. In Goines’ view, “where the basis for detention rests on the diagnosis of a mental health disorder, there is simply no probable cause for detention where the evaluator making the diagnosis is not properly trained to do so.” Brief of Appellant at 37-38.

Even assuming that a deficiency in training could negate the probable cause otherwise established by the facts set forth in the Screening Report, we disagree with Goines’ assertion that Rhodes lacked the necessary qualifications. As Goines recognized in his complaint, Rhodes evaluated Goines in her capacity as the “designee and employee of Defendant Valley Community Services Board.” J.A. 14. Under Virginia law, designees of local community services boards must be “skilled in the assessment and treatment of mental illness” and must have “completed a certification program approved by the Department [of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services],” Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-809(A); see Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-100. Such designees are specifically authorized to conduct evaluations and determine whether the criteria for temporary detention are met. See Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-809(B). Although Rhodes is not a psychologist, she has the qualifications deemed necessary by Virginia to evaluate Goines and determine the need for temporary detention, an inquiry that requires determining whether a mental illness is present. See Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-809(B) (authorizing involuntary temporary detention “if it appears from all evidence readily available,” that, inter alia, “the person . . . has a mental illness and . . . there exists a substantial likelihood that, as a result of mental illness, the person will, in the near future, . . . cause serious physical harm to himself or others as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening harm and other relevant information”). Rhodes thus did not mislead the magistrate, and Goines’ qualifications- based challenge to Rhodes’ actions fails.

28 cause, Goines’ complaint fails to allege a constitutional

violation by Rhodes. The determination that Rhodes did not

violate Goines’ constitutional rights also forecloses Goines’

claims against Valley Community Services Board, Rhodes’

employer. See, e.g., Waybright v. Frederick Cty., 528 F.3d 199,

203 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[M]unicipalities cannot be liable under §

1983 without some predicate constitutional injury at the hands

of the individual state officer . . . .” (internal quotation

marks and alteration omitted)). We therefore affirm the

district court’s dismissal of Goines’ claims against Rhodes and

her employer.

V.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm

the district court’s dismissal of Goines’ claims against Rhodes,

Valley Community Services Board, and Officer D.L. Williams.

However, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of Goines’

claims against Officers Shaw and Dean, and we remand for further

proceedings on those claims. In concluding that the complaint

against Officers Shaw and Dean survives a motion to dismiss, we

need not and do not reach the question of whether the summary

judgment record would afford a sound basis for awarding judgment

to defendants.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

29 NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I am pleased to concur in Chief Judge Traxler’s fine

opinion, recognizing his nuanced articulation of how the pleader

may variously use a document incorporated into the complaint. I

write this brief concurrence only to note that, in determining

qualified immunity, we need not recognize only the pleader’s

version of the facts that are stated in the incorporated

document if the document is taken to state those facts

accurately from the defendants’ point of view, here the

officers’ point of view. Thus, if the document -- in this case,

the Incident Report -- were taken to state accurately the

officers’ perceptions, we could use those perceptions to

determine qualified immunity. See Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d

167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994). In Rowland, Judge Wilkinson wrote:

Though it focuses on the objective facts, the immunity inquiry must be filtered through the lens of the officer’s perceptions at the time of the incident in question. Such a perspective serves two purposes. First, using the officer’s perception of the facts at the time limits second-guessing the reasonableness of actions with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. Second, using this perspective limits the need for decision- makers to sort through conflicting versions of the “actual” facts, and allows them to focus instead on what the police officer reasonably perceived.

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

On remand, the officers will be able to supply their own

affidavits of their perceptions at the time of the incident,

30 thus enabling the district court to conduct an appropriate

analysis of their qualified immunity defense.

31