J-S57021-14
2014 PA Super 214
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
EUGENE MILLER
Appellant No. 3551 EDA 2013
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 21, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004094-2004
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.
OPINION BY MUNDY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014
Appellant, Eugene Miller, appeals pro se from the November 21, 2013
order dismissing his second petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful
review, we affirm.
We summarize the relevant procedural history of this case as follows.
On October 25, 2004, the Commonwealth filed an information charging
Appellant with one count each of murder, simple assault, aggravated
assault, recklessly endangering another person (REAP), persons not to
possess a firearm, possession of a firearm without a license, and possession J-S57021-14
of an instrument of a crime (PIC).1 On May 10, 2005, Appellant proceeded
to a jury trial. On May 25, 2005, the jury found Appellant guilty of third-
degree murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm without a
license, and PIC. The Commonwealth withdrew the remaining charges. On
July 18, 2005, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 27½ to 55 2 Relevant to this appeal, the trial court imposed the
New Jersey. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2) (providing for a minimum
here the person had at the time of
the commission of the current offense previously been convicted of two or
On July 20, 2005, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which
the trial court denied on December 14, 2005. Appellant filed a timely notice
of appeal, and this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on October 23,
2007. Commonwealth v. Miller, 943 A.2d 318 (Pa. Super. 2007)
____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 2701(a), 2702(a), 2705, 6105(a), 6106(a)(1), and 907(b), respectively. 2
- imprisonment for firearms not to be carried without a license, and no further penalty for aggravated assault. The sentence for PIC is to run concurrently to the sentence for third-degree murder, but the sentence for the firearms charge was to run consecutively to the third-degree murder sentence.
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(unpublished memorandum) (Miller I), appeal denied, 947 A.2d 736 (Pa.
appeal on May 8, 2008. Appellant did not file a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
On August 7, 2009, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition. The PCRA
court appointed counsel, who filed an application to withdraw along with a
- Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
1988), Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en
banc), and their progeny. On April 30, 2010, the PCRA court granted PCRA
issued its notice of intent to dismiss Appell
hearing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. Appellant
did not file a response, and the PCRA court entered an order dismissing
notic
2012. Commonwealth v. Miller, 50 A.3d 233 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance
of appeal with our Supreme Court.
On August 8, 2013, Appellant filed his second PCRA petition. On
October 1, 2013, the PCRA court issued its Rule 907 notice, concluding that
exception to the time-bar. Appellant did not file a response. On November
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PCRA petition. On December 16, 2013, Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal.3
On appeal, Appellant raises the following two issues for our review.
[1.] Whether [a] newly recognized constitutional Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013)], has been held to appeal [sic] retroactively, within the 60-day filing period begins [sic] to run upon the date of the underlying judicial decision of June 17, 2013[?]
[2.] Whether the decision was rendered during the
was properly preserved[?]
We begin by noting our well- In reviewing
the denial of PCRA
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation
dings
of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most
Commonwealth v.
Spotz -settled
determinations are binding upon an appellate
Commonwealth v. ____________________________________________ 3 Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Robinson, 82 A.3d 998, 1013 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). However, this
de novo. Commonwealth
v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
We also note that a PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled to an
petition without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.
Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 604 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
[T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a post- conviction petition is not absolute. It is within the
the petition support either in the record or other evidence. It is the responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine each issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record certified before it in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in its determination that there were no genuine issues of material fact in controversy and in denying relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal
cit
fishing expedition for any possible evidence that may support some
Roney, supra at 605 (citation
omitted).
Before we may address the merits o
because it
implicates the jurisdiction of this Court and the PCRA court.
Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883, 887 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
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omitted). Pennsylvani a PCRA petition is
untimely, neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the
Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 241 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted). not subject to the
doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can
Commonwealth
v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)
Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition alleges,
and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to the
time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and
(iii) Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. Super.
2014) (citation omitted). The PCRA provides, in relevant part, as follows.
§ 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings
(b) Time for filing petition.
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the
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presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
In the case sub judice, Appellant was sentenced on July 18, 2005.
This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on October 23, 2007, and our
Supreme Court denied allocator on May 8, 2008. Appellant did not seek a
writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. Therefore,
, when the
period for Appellant to file a petition for a writ of certiorari expired. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § a judgment becomes final at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
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Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
; U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (stating
certiorari
timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after entry
file his PCRA petition. As Appellant filed the instant petition on August 8,
2013, it was patently untimely because it was filed more than four years
past the deadline. However, Appellant avers that the time-bar exception at
in Alleyne announced a new constitutional right that applies retroactively.4
Id. at 6, 13, 15.
Subsection (iii) of Section 9545[(b)(1)] has two requirements. First, it provides that the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] after the time provided in this section. Second, it provides that the
____________________________________________ 4 In addition to pleading and proving one of the three enumerated exceptions to the time-bar, this Court has often explained that all of the PCRA time-bar exceptions are subject t A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within sixty days of the date Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651-652 (Pa. Super. 2013), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). We note that Alleyne was decided on June 17, 2013 and Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on August 8, 2013, 52 days after Alleyne was decided. Therefore, Appellant has complied with Section 9545(b)(2).
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retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must prove that and that the
past tense. These words mean that the action has already occurred, i.e., the new constitutional right to be retroactive to cases on collateral review. By employing the past tense in writing this provision, the legislature clearly intended that the right was already recognized at the time the petition was filed.
Seskey, supra at 242-243 (citations omitted).
As noted above, Appellant argues that Alleyne announced a new
In Alleyne facts that increase mandatory
minimum sentences must be submitted to the jur
beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, supra at 2163. Alleyne is an
Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Alleyne, the Court overruled Harris
v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), in which the Court had reached the
opposite conclusion, explaining that there is no constitutional distinction
between judicial fact finding which raises the minimum sentence and that
which raises the maximum sentence.
It is impossible to dissociate the floor of a sentencing range from the penalty affixed to the crime. Indeed, criminal statutes have long specified both the floor and ceiling of sentence ranges, which is evidence that both define the legally prescribed penalty. This historical practice allowed those who violated the law to know, ex ante, the contours of the penalty that the legislature affixed to the crime
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and comports with the obvious truth that the floor of a mandatory range is as relevant to wrongdoers as the ceiling. A fact that increases a sentencing floor, thus, forms an essential ingredient of the offense.
Moreover, it is impossible to dispute that facts increasing the legally prescribed floor aggravate the punishment. Elevating the low-end of a sentencing range heightens the loss of liberty associated with
increased as a result of the narrowed range and the prosecution is empowered, by invoking the mandatory minimum, to require the judge to impose a higher punishment than he might wish. Why else would Congress link an increased mandatory minimum to a particular aggravating fact other than to heighten the consequences for that behavior? This reality demonstrates that the core crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury.
Alleyne, supra at 2160-2161 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Even assuming that Alleyne did announce a new constitutional right,
neither our Supreme Court, nor the United States Supreme Court has held
that Alleyne is to be applied retroactively to cases in which the judgment of
t regarding
the PCRA time-bar. This Court has recognized that a new rule of
constitutional law is applied retroactively to cases on collateral review only if
the United States Supreme Court or our Supreme Court specifically holds it
to be retroactively applicable to those cases. Commonwealth v. Phillips,
31 A.3d 317, 320 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 42 A.3d 1059 (Pa.
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2012), citing Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001); see also, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(s
have also ruled on the retroactivity of the new constitutional right, before
the petitioner can assert retroactive application of the right in a PCRA
appeal denied, 951 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 2008). Therefore, Appellant
has failed to satisfy the new constitutional right exception to the time-bar.5
We are aware that an issue pertaining to Alleyne goes to the legality
of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Newman, --- A.3d ---, 2014 WL
4088805, *3 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc
sentence premised upon Alleyne likewise implicates the legality of the
It is generally true this
____________________________________________ 5
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) held that the fact of a prior conviction does not need to be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 246. Alleyne explicitly noted that Almendarez-Torres remains good law. See Alleyne, supra [i]n Almendarez Torres prior conviction[; however, b]ecause the parties do not contest that
As noted above, in this case, Appellant received a higher sentence due to the fact of his prior convictions in New Jersey, pursuant to Section 9714(a)(2). Miller I, supra at 7-9; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2).
prior convictions, it is not prohibited by Alleyne.
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Court is endowed with the ability to consider an issue of illegality of sentence
sua sponte Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 883 n.7 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (citation omitted). However, in order for this Court to review a
legality of sentence claim, there must be a basis for our jurisdiction to
engage in such review. See Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d
1242, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2011)
not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim may nevertheless be
-bar
Seskey, supra at 242. As a result, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the mer
filed and no exception was proven. See Fears, supra; Lawson, supra.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the PCRA court correctly
November 21, 2013 order is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/26/2014
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